Farewell to the Bosniaks

When my grandfather and I were watching video footage of Mladic taking the Bosniak males away on buses, he had two comments. 1. "It's not fair" 2. "The Serbs are making the Germans happy because when any European thinks of fascists, the will think of Serbia!

In Bosnia, Catholics are Croatians, Orthodox are Serbians and Muslims are Bosniaks. This gives Bosnia a certain symmetry which makes it easier to discuss a very complicated political situation . The Bosniaks are making a huge mistake to try to change the Bosnian constitution for Srebrenica, which to me, seems totally beside the point.

The Bosniaks first mistake was to go along with the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Their second mistake is to not voice objection to the independence of Kosovo. Bosniaks must realize that they will be the immediate losers if Kosovo gets independence, because what's good for Kosovo is good for Republica Srpbska, not to mention Herzegovina.

Watch for the US/EU criticize the Bosniaks, in the press, as being obstructionist and not willing to compromise. Then you will know that betrayal is in the air.

Calls for Srebrenica secession follow ICJ ruling
(SETimes.com):

"In the aftermath of the ruling, Bosniak leaders are calling for Srebrenica to secede from the Bosnian Serb entity, Republika Srpska (RS).

'The territory of the Srebrenica municipality needs to have the status of district and as such should be taken out of the jurisdiction of the Republika Srpska institutions,' the Bosniak and Croat members of the BiH presidency, Haris Silajdzic and Zeljko Komsic, said in a statement. 'We are entitled to justice.'"

Richard, It's America's Test In Kosovo, Not Russia's

This was posted on the comments section of the Washington Post.

I will not go into detail as to why this oped, if adopted, as it seems it will by the UN, will promote civil war in the Balkans and around the world for the foreseeable future.

Basically Kosovo is not a unique case. I just think that it is incumbent on Richard Holbrooke to explain why Kosovo deserves independence, while Republica Srpska in Bosnia does not.

Why does Iraqi Kurdistan deserve autonomy within a federal Iraq, while in Turkish Kurdistan people, are thrown in jail for writing histories in the Kurdish language.

Why do Albanians in Macedonia deserve increased rights while the Macedonians in Greece and Bulgaria are struggling to gain minimal rights.

The pursuit of American self interest in the Balkans means different standards for each situation, which makes it impossible for moderates in each country to reach out to moderates in other countries. That is the key to destabilization in the Balkans. A key which the United States holds. Richard, "take the log out of your own eye, before you complain about the splinter in someone else's eye".

Russia's Test In Kosovo
Richard Holbrooke
Washington Post

Russia contends that the United Nations does not have the right to change an international border without the agreement of the country involved. But Kosovo is a unique case and sets no precedent for separatist movements elsewhere, because in 1999, with Russian support, the United Nations was given authority to decide the future of Kosovo.

Moscow's point about protecting "fraternal" Slav-Serb feelings is nonsense; (Not total nonsense) everyone who has dealt with the Russians on the Balkans, as I did for several years, knows that their leadership has no feelings whatsoever for the Serbs. (Not True) Russia is using Kosovo for its tactical advantage, as part of a strategy to reassert itself on the international stage. (We can only hope that Putin is this smart). That is a legitimate goal, as long as Russia plays a constructive role -- but Moscow's recent behavior, from Georgia to Iran to some ugly domestic incidents, is not encouraging.

New Common Values NGO

It will be interesting to see how this new NGO handles the treatment of Macedonians in Bulgaria. Greece and Turkey are excluded, so naturally, I smell a plot! "Pseudo Human Rights Group(?) , I can't be sure, but all the signs are there.

Common Values
FOSIM Web Site:

In 2006 Common Values will implement a regional initiative Minority Rights in Practice in SEE, involving Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Croatia. The Program is financed by FOSIM, King Baudouin Foundation, and Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. It promotes law regulations and ethnic community rights conventions in Macedonia, strengthens the NGO sector to address problems and needs and to include citizens in the decentralization process on national and local level.

Starting from January 2006 Common Values will be a part of the regional project Dialogue for Interaction. Advocacy and Networking Capacity Building for Minority Rights in Practice in SEE – DIANET supported by the European Commission. Common Values will implement the project together with NGOs from Albania and Serbia, and the King Baudouin Foundation.
The overall goal of the project is to increase the possibilities of equal participation and access of minorities in the context of the democratic stabilization of the region, and in view of EU international objectives. Common Values will prepare shadow reports, including results of monitoring and analyzing conditions, problems and needs of minority communities in six municipalities, and enactment of the legislation regarding the protection of minority community rights and their equal participation in the bodies and institutions"

US/EU Balkan and Russian Policy: "Because I Said So"

The Balkan counties are being destabilized, but not by Russia. They are destabilized by the US/EU and the destabilization program seems to have its own momentum without a brake or reverse gear! If Olli Rehn can make any sense of the US/EU policies below, I am willing to listen.

US/EU to Serbia: Kosovo must be independent. "BECAUSE I SAID SO!"

US/EU to Kosovo: No union with Albania. "BECAUSE I SAID SO!"

US/EU to Bosnia: No independence for Republica Srbska. "BECAUSE I SAID SO!"

US/EU to Macedonia: Increased rights for Albanians. "BECAUSE I SAID SO!"

US/EU to Bulgaria and Greece: No rights for ethnic Macedonians. "BECAUSE I SAID SO!"

US/EU Russia: Subsidize oil to Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia. "BECAUSE I SAID SO!"


Rehn says Russia's veto can destabilize Balkan
Makfax vesnik:

Berlin/London /27/02/ 11:40

The eventual Russia's veto at the UN Security Council on Martti Ahtisaari's blueprint could unleash a chaos and instability in the Balkan region, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said.

The BBC's Serbian news service quotes extracts from Commissioner Rehn's address to the International Bertelsmann Forum in Berlin. He said the eventual veto by Russia is not in line with Moscow's principles.

According to Rehn, Russia's threat to use its veto powers at the UN Security Council is quite unusual given the fact that Russia condemns unilateral moves in general. /end/"

What's Good for Kosovo is Not Good for Bosnia!

This is a news story from January but it is relevant today. I have never seen these EU nut cases really grilled as to why Kosovo and Bosnia cannot be linked. The Balkan journalists are too frighted to ask and the EU journalists are to lazy to even try to understand the issues.

Schwarz-Schilling, Solana condemn attempts to link RS with Kosovo status (SETimes.com):

18/01/2007

BRUSSELS, Belgium -- High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Christian Schwarz-Schilling and EU security chief Javier Solana condemned on Wednesday (January 17th) any attempt to link the future of BiH's Republika Srpska (RS) with the Kosovo status issue. Following talks with Solana, as well as with EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn in Brussels, Schwarz-Schilling said the EU was unhappy with comments from Belgrade suggesting the outcome of the Kosovo status issue would impact RS. He reiterated that BiH is a sovereign state, whose territorial integrity is guaranteed by the Dayton Peace Accord and said that Serbia, as a signatory to Dayton, must respect its international commitments. (Nezavisne novine - 18/01/07; OHR Sources, PBS BiH - 17/01/07)"

Kosovo Independence if Necessary, but not Necessarily Independence

Kosovo, along with Bosnia has become a make work project for UN diplomats and professional pseudo-peace makers. No one can say why Kosovo should be independent, while Republica Srpska cannot. I wish I could write a piece that makes sense of it all, but I can't.

U.N. Offers Plan for Kosovo’s Independence - New York Times:

"The recommendations would leave the former Yugoslav province free to declare independence from Serbia, according to Western diplomats who have seen the plan. But they say it would also impose international supervision, much like what exists in Bosnia, to provide protection for Kosovo’s ethnic Serbs."

What is Patrick Moore Talking About? I don't Know.

I have noticed a decidedly anti-EU tone of several posts about the Balkans from Radio Free Europe. This is just another one of those articles that criticise the EU. You will never see an article critical of the US, since it funds Radio Free Europe. RFE's range definition of Europe has expanded to include Iran, Iraq and Tartarstan (!) (Russia). Anyway, this article is a combination of common sense and nonsense that would take too much time to critique. It's the anti-EU tone that has tweaked my interest.

Balkans: Is It Time For An Alternative To The EU?
RADIO FREE EUROPE / RADIO LIBERTY

Patrick Moore


PRAGUE, June 25, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- One truism of postcommunist Europe is that all the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans will sooner or later join the EU and NATO. It seems, however, that the countries of the western Balkans might find themselves in a "black hole" outside the EU for the foreseeable future even if they are surrounded by member states. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia face uncertainty in their hopes to join the EU.

The Brussels-based bloc has a particular attraction for the countries of the region for three reasons.

Looking Toward The EU

First, membership means a seat at the table where decisions affecting all of Europe are made. The small Balkan states might not wield much influence, but it is better to be inside looking out than outside looking in, or so the argument has run.

Second, joining the EU symbolizes the end of the continent's division and the inclusion of former communist countries -- including war-torn states -- in the "rich man's club." For former Yugoslavs, whose passport was once the only one in Europe with which one could travel freely to the East or West without a visa, it means a return to a normal situation. It also means an end to the inconvenience and humiliation of having to go through often-long procedures for something that was once so simple as a visit to relatives working in Germany. The importance of visa-free travel for ordinary people in the western Balkans should not be underestimated.

And third, as poorer members of a wealthy organization, the western Balkan states would be able to look forward to a cornucopia of subsidies, as well as opportunities for fairly unfettered study and work. In short, even if NATO membership will some day provide for these countries' security requirements, joining the EU is still regarded in the region as an essential part of its rite of passage into the modern, prosperous, and democratic world.

Avoiding The Black Hole

For Brussels, integrating the western Balkans has long meant that there will be no "black hole" in the middle of the EU -- especially after Bulgaria and Romania join in 2008 or so -- in which organized crime could flourish. More recently, some Western governments have come to see EU membership for the western Balkans as a way of keeping out of that region unwelcome but well-funded political, criminal, or religious influences from Russia or the Middle East.

By offering the prospect of membership, the EU has, moreover, a powerful lever to influence precisely the kind of changes -- called "reforms" -- that it wants to see implemented. Progress has been slow in some countries, but the view from Brussels for years was that it is better to have slow progress than to isolate a potentially volatile region that is indisputably part of Europe and right on the doorstep of several member states.

Expansion Fatigue Strikes

But then on May 29, 2005, French voters rejected the proposed EU constitution by a clear majority, and Dutch voters did the same by an even larger margin three days later. In both cases, objections to further enlargement of the EU after the admission of 10 new members in 2004 played at least some role in the vote.

One year after those two votes, the EU is none the clearer as to its goals and how to achieve them. In June 2006, a summit took place in Vienna, but there was no agreement on any of the key issues, including the fate of the constitution. The only consensus seemed to appear in putting off any possible movement on thorny questions until the German Presidency in the first half of 2007, or maybe to the French Presidency in the second half of 2008.

It was perhaps telling for the newer members -- and those who would like to join -- that a joint declaration by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia was "slapped down," as the "Financial Times" put it on June 17, by Luxembourg, Germany, and other, unnamed EU founder states. The five Central European countries had called into question what they regard as their second-class status within the bloc and demonstrated their willingness to work together. Some observers recalled French President Jacques Chirac's remark about a 2003 declaration by a similar group of countries, which backed the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. The French leader said at that time that they had missed an opportunity to "shut up."

Before and during the summit, several leaders of older member states made it clear that one cannot speak of enlargement, at least beyond Romania and Bulgaria, before the growing EU has decided at least on how it will manage its internal affairs. That would mean 2009 at the very earliest. Consequently, many people in countries hoping to join that body began to fear that their chances of obtaining membership within a reasonable time frame had become much slimmer as a result.

This was true for Croatia, which had long sought to convince itself that its membership on the heels of Romania and Bulgaria was a foregone conclusion. Many people in the western Balkans suspected that the EU was keeping them at arm's length as a pretext for dodging the larger and more controversial question of Turkish membership. After all, the reasoning in the Balkans went, had not the West Europeans told them for years that integrating such small states would not require much money and effort on Brussels' part?

Meanwhile, antireform forces in the Balkans took heart, blocking police and constitutional reform in Bosnia. In Serbia, they continue to thwart the arrest and extradition to the Hague-based war crimes tribunal of former Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic, with the result that relations between Belgrade and Brussels are on hold.

Time For A Local Alternative?

The question then arises: if Brussels is unlikely to offer the western Balkans a serious "European perspective" within a clear time frame and if some people in those countries are becoming less enamored of a EU that does not seem to want them, might it not be time for the people in the western Balkans to reexamine old beliefs about the necessary postcommunist rite of passage and look for alternatives? Has not the obsession with EU membership become something of a white elephant, like the EU-sponsored bridge over the Prut River from Romania to Moldova that stood unused for several years for want of a road on the Moldovan side?

How else might the countries of the region modernize their economies and expand their markets than with top-down efforts at nation-building and seemingly endless rules imposed from abroad? Might it not be to their advantage to concentrate first on developing straightforward free-trade and travel arrangements that would not involve compromising what for most of them is newly won sovereignty in favor of a distant and unelected bureaucracy?

Some Euroskeptics have long argued that the EU is cumbersome, inflexible, nontransparent, and dominated by Paris and Berlin. Might some other parts of Europe now find themselves faced with an opportunity to develop alternative ideas to the EU model that are simpler, more democratic, and hence more likely to produce clear results and win popular support? After all, there is no better incentive for learning to think outside the box than being denied permission to enter the box.

Independence for Kosovo?

I read political opinion columnists, from George Will and Charles Krauthammer on the right, to Michael Kinsley in the center, to Eric Alterman on the left. I rarely read newspaper editorials because they are unsigned. It is like talking to someone who wears sun glasses indoors ... it is just plain rude. To some, unsigned editorials give off wiff of mysterious authority, like the ten commandments being brought down from the mountain from an unseen god. While to others, it gives of a stench of conspiracy with greedy forces in smoke filled rooms promoting civil war around the world for fun and profit.

I will not go into detail as to why this editorial, if adopted, as it seems it will by the UN, will promote civil war in the Balkans and around the world for the foreseeable future. I just think that it is incumbent on the geniuses at the New York Times editorial board to explain why Kosovo deserves independence, while Republica Serpska in Bosnia does not. Why does Iraqi Kurdistan deserve autonomy within a federal Iraq while in Turkish Kurdistan people are thrown in jail for writing histories in the Kurdish language. Why do Albanians in Macedonia get to eat "human rights cake" while the Macedonains in Greece have to eat "human rights crap".

And finally, maybe the geniuses at the New York Times can explain why it only rains on the weekend.

New York Times
Editorial
Navigating Kosovo’s Future

Published: August 18, 2006

The 1999 war over Kosovo left the former Serbian province in political limbo, postponing the question of possible independence for another day. That day is now at hand, and the main question facing the international community is not whether Kosovo will become independent, but when and how. Status talks are expected to conclude in the next few months, with the United Nations Security Council to rule on the issue by the end of the year.

The original plan was for Kosovo’s political leaders to demonstrate their ability to govern responsibly before formal discussions of sovereignty could begin. They haven’t really done so, although they have made some grudging moves under international pressure.

Yet as a practical matter, Kosovo’s international wardship cannot be extended indefinitely. The most promising way to encourage further progress is by moving ahead to a carefully conditioned form of limited autonomy.

The most critical issue, now as ever, is guaranteeing the rights of the ethnic Serb minority. Any independence arrangement will have to assure minorities a substantial role in government, particularly in sensitive areas like the Justice Ministry.

For the first few years at least, the powers of Kosovo’s new government must be strictly limited. An international authority will have to monitor the government’s fulfillment of internationally agreed conditions, paying special attention to issues like the rule of law and minority rights. A few thousand NATO-led troops should remain in Kosovo with the power to intervene when necessary to compel compliance.

Most of the countries with troops in Kosovo would prefer to bring them home now. But Kosovo’s march toward independence is going to remain difficult and dangerous for years. The need for a continuing armed international presence should be non-negotiable.

Will Carla del Ponte Respond to This Letter?

Good for Vinozhito. Keep these letters flying. I doubt that Carla will even respond to this letter, but it puts on the public record that Macedonians are still kicking in Greece.

2005 Letter to Carla del Ponte Chief Prosecutor for the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia:

"In the past, the Macedonian minority in Greece was also a victim of genocidal practices and chauvinistic Balkan policies. For example, the Greek army carried out massacres against Macedonian populations and burned villages in the region of Kilkis/Kukush at the beginning of the last century, according to the Carnegie Commission report (1913). This fact obliges us to treat similar problems with particular seriousness and sensitivity within the framework of our political activity.

In Greece, during the war in Bosnia and Kosovo, most politicians, the majority of the intellectual and cultural world, the Greek Orthodox Church and the greater portion of the mass media did not simply openly support even those being sought today for crimes against humanity: Karadjic and Mladic. They moreover reproached those European peoples and governments for their opposing position, thus systematically creating an anti-European and generally anti-western political current in Greek society. Characteristically, the current President of the Hellenic Republic Karolos Papoulias as Foreign Affairs Minister claimed in a Greek radio interview (March 2001) that the only reason for the NATO military presence in the region was to wipe Serbia off the map, politically and militarily, so as to deprive Russia of its only European ally."

Free Advice: You Get What You Pay For.

Pauline Neville-Jones, who was a member of the International Commission on the Balkans, (as is Kiro Gligorov), is a silly little tart. The main problem with her report and with this op-ed piece is that she assumes that the EU is there to solve the problems of the Balkans. We all know that the EU is part of the problem because it has ignored human rights violations of Kurds in Turkey, Macedonians in Greece. Even as you read this the EU pressures the Republic of Macedonia to change its name, the name of the Macedonian language and the name of the Macedonian Orthodox Church to appease Greece. Pauline has so many plans for so many people in so many countries but she will not admit that Greek values regarding minority rights are EU values. That is the problem.

Yahoo! Groups : RMDigest Messages : Message 4523 of 4609: "A Balkan rethink is required before it is too late

http://news.ft.com/cms/s/914afef0-d5e7-11d9-8040-00000e2511c8.html

By Pauline Neville-Jones

Today, there is no fighting in the Balkans, there is no ethnic cleansing and there are elections. There has been progress in the decade since the Bosnia peace agreement. But, Croatia aside, the former Yugoslavia is drifting. Political development is stunted, unemployment high, growth low and corruption pervasive.

More dangerous is the fact that, as the International Crisis Group recently reported, Kosovo stands on the edge of renewed conflict. Pessimism prevails among suspicious, isolated people who are unable to get visas to travel abroad. The Balkans is becoming ghettoised as the gap between the region and the rest of Europe widens.

The international community continues to pour in money. Almost half of Europe's deployable military force is stuck. Exit is impossible as long as Bosnia is governed by an imposed proconsular figure, the status of Kosovo is undecided and the region lacks a vision of the future.

The European Union needs to fulfil the promise its leaders made in Thessalonika in 2003 to integrate the Balkan countries. This can only mean enlargement of the Union. If the EU reneges, there are two possible outcomes: Europe entrenches empire merely to keep law and order, or it lets go to the revived forces of nationalism and conflict. Both are deeply unappealing.

The International Commission on the Balkans, led by Giuliano Amato, the former Italian prime minister, recently issued a report on the way forward. *The commission is clear that present policy, which evolved piecemeal, will no longer do. A coherent, long-term action plan leading to the establishment of stable and open societies is urgently needed.

The commission proposes three big steps towards integration. First, a summit should be held in 2006 at which the Balkan countries would be set on their respective roads to EU accession. Most countries will first need extensive preparation in which institutions are built and small national markets opened up to the regional free trade that is indispensable to attracting private investors. The region should provide its own security. All the countries should join Nato's Partnership for Peace. The role played by Nato in central and eastern Europe in modernising armed forces and creating the climate of confidence indispensable to stability should be replicated in the Balkans.

Policy on justice and human rights needs adjustment. It is easier for local leaders to refuse to surrender indicted war criminals than to improve their international standing by complying with outside pressure. Balkan
governments cannot escape their obligations to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, but the commission considers that co-operation so far has been good enough to move to the stage of 'Europe Agreements' - in which resources would start to flow in the context of countries enforcing standards. In Kosovo, 'standards before status' blocks decisions that are urgently needed to prevent a new slide into violence. The United Nations is right to have instituted a review of its weak administration that is barely in control of local political infighting. The commission advocates an early start on staged moves (which require the co-operation of Belgrade) to full sovereignty realised within, but only within, the EU. Kosovo's independence arouses strong emotions. But neither return to rule from Belgrade or doing nothing is an option. The commission's polling suggests that Kosovo's independence would not lead to the dismemberment of Bosnia but could tempt Kosovo Albanians to seek a 'Greater Albania' that could drive conflict in Macedonia along ethnic lines.

The EU must use its muscle to enforce acceptable outcomes. The EU needs to rethink its thin policy towards Serbia-Montenegro. Managing Kosovo requires this, as does the need either to revive or put an end to the dysfunctional federation.

Finally, Bosnia. Much has been achieved under international administrators but their power now stops local leaders assuming their responsibilities. A special EU negotiator, exercising soft power rather than sovereignty, should replace them - and soon.

The commission has suggested an ambitious accession timetable. Substance must have priority over timing. But the EU should rise to the challenge of bringing the Balkans into the European mainstream not later than a century after the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, which sparked the cataclysms of the 20th century.

* _www.balkan-commission.org_ (http://www.balkan-commission.org/)
Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, who was a member of the International Commission on the Balkans, is chairman of QinetiQ
"

Kosovo independence would set Europe on fire - Serbia-Montenegro minister

Vuk Draskovic is a certified nut case, but he is right on this issue. The US/EU want different standards for Kosovo, Bosnia, Crimea etc. They want to pick and chose who gets the elevator and who gets the shaft. This is the source of instability in the Balkans and indeed the world.

Kosovo independence would set Europe on fire - Serbia-Montenegro minister: "Media Monitor

Excerpt from report by Montenegrin Mina news agency

Belgrade, 26 June: The independence of Kosovo would automatically lead to the independence of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic because the same principles would apply, Serbia-Montenegro Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic has said.

'In my contacts with world leaders, I insist on the principle of identical standards and I always tell them that the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina would become more stable if the Kosovo problem was resolved within the Serbian framework. Let the Serbs of the Serb Republic get everything that will be granted to the Kosovo Albanians,' Draskovic told Blic [Belgrade-based daily].

According to Draskovic, the world understands that the future status of Kosovo must be a result of a compromise and an unconventional solution.

'The worst thing would be to impose a declaration of Kosovo's independence. I tell everyone that no Serbian politician will sign a document granting independence to Kosovo. Without Serbia's approval, such a declaration would immediately cause upheaval in Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Albania,' Draskovic said.

This fire could destabilize Europe and Kosovo's independence would provoke demands for the same status to be granted to the Serb Republic, the Turkish part of Cyprus, Basque country, Northern Ireland, Corsica and South Ossetia. [Passage omitted]

Source: Mina news agency, Podgorica, in Serbian 1907 gmt 26 Jun 05

BBC Mon EU1 EuroPol mb/cg"

Some Guests Never Know When to Leave.

It looks like the US Army will be with Macedonia for a little while longer. I'm not sure it is such a bad idea at the present time, but like a pitbull, you never know when it might turn on you.

Text of a Letter from the President to the Congress of the United States:

"For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
June 23, 2005

Text of a Letter from the President to the Congress of the United States

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed notice to the Federal Register for publication, stating that the Western Balkans emergency is to continue in effect beyond June 26, 2005. The most recent notice continuing this emergency was published in the Federal Register on June 25, 2004, 69 FR 36005.

The crisis constituted by the actions of persons engaged in, or assisting, sponsoring, or supporting (i) extremist violence in the Republic of Macedonia, and elsewhere in the Western Balkans region, or (ii) acts obstructing implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia or United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 10, 1999, in Kosovo, that led to the declaration of a national emergency on June 26, 2001, has not been resolved. Subsequent to the declaration of the national emergency, I amended Executive Order 13219 in Executive Order 13304 of May 28, 2003, to address acts obstructing implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001 in the Republic of Macedonia, which have also become a concern. The acts of extremist violence and obstructionist activity outlined in Executive Order 13219, as amended, are hostile to U.S. interests and pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For these reasons, I have determined tha emergency declared with respect to the Western Balkans and maintain in force the comprehensive sanctions to respond to this threat.

GEORGE W. BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 23, 2005."

A consensus of Serbian positions on Kosovo

I have reproduced the entire article. It is an excellent discussion of Serbian positions on Kosovo from autonomy to partition. I think that all of the arguments presented here are beside the point since the US/ES will do what is in its own self-interest. It has been announced that the US State Department will release its definitive position on Kosovo in the near future. My guess is that it will fall short of independence but will include substantial autonomy. This will be good for Macedonia.

An independent Kosovo will cause ripples from Macedonia and Bosnia to the Crimea and Georgia. If they endorse independence for Kosovo, watch for all hell to break loose and look forward to pressure from Washington for the partition of Russia via the route of liberation of ethnic groups starting with the Chechens, the Tartars etc.

Remember, "just because you are paranoid, does not mean that people aren't following you."


Institute for War and Peace Reporting:

"Serbia Hones Negotiating Position"

Politicians in Serbia are straining to persuade the world not to grant the Kosovo Albanians statehood.

By Vesna Bjekic in Belgrade (BCR No 556, 18-May-05)

While the leadership of Serbia and Montenegro prepares its platform for negotiations on Kosovo's future status, it is clear now that Belgrade is ready to accept any solution that does not involve international recognition of Kosovo's independence.

A meeting of the leaders of Serbia and Montenegro on developing a strategy on Kosovo, scheduled to take place behind closed doors in Belgrade on May 18, will be the fifth such meeting in two months.

However, details about Serbia's strategy will not be made public until the autumn, when the negotiations are expected to begin.

After several years in which the various political blocs have proposed a number of different options, the leadership now stands united around the platform that Kosovo's independence would contravene international norms on the inviolability of state borders.

They also maintain it would provoke instability in the region as well as in Serbia.

While that constitutes the official position, officials privately admit they will accept almost any solution except independence as that would constitute political suicide for the leadership as well as radicalising the public and distancing Serbia permanently from Europe.

Although Serbia is not willing to take up arms over the territory and has no interest in refusing cooperation with the international community, that does not mean it will ever voluntarily endorse recognition of Kosovo. As a result, such a solution can be enforced only from outside.

CLOSING RANKS IN PREPARATION FOR TALKS

Until March this year, official Belgrade repeatedly released dissonant messages on Kosovo, both to the Kosovo Serbs and to the international community. One bloc urged the Serbs to vote in last autumn's parliamentary elections in Kosovo, for example, while another urged the opposite.

Such disputes were abandoned this March, after the announcement that negotiations on the final status of Kosovo might begin as early as the second half of this year.

The first meeting of the state leadership on Kosovo took place on March 14 behind closed doors. The public announcement that followed stated an agreement had emerged on the formula "more than autonomy, less than independence". Before the March meeting, Serbia's deputy premier Miroljub Labus commented, "It is good that Belgrade finally managed to speak out with one voice."

The leadership has held regular meetings since then, bringing together Svetozar Marovic, President of the State Union, Boris Tadic, President of Serbia, Vojislav Kostunica, Prime Minister of Serbia, Vuk Draskovic, state union foreign minister and Nebojsa Covic, president of the government's Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija.

Covic revealed some details of the March meeting to a press conference of his Social Democratic Party, when he said they had agreed a team of consultants should come up with "a draft document, containing tactical moves by the government" by the end of March.

Covic added that this draft document would be based on the principles of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo and on the government of Serbia's own recent Plan for Kosovo, among others. Covic said this coordinated approach would mean the end of individual actions and personal initiatives.

Significantly, the establishment of this joint position was first disclosed by Labus and Covic, who have advocated very different positions on Kosovo in the past. Last November, Labus suggested Belgrade should request the organisation of an international conference on Kosovo's status, to be held this November.

He said Serbia should put forward a plan for an autonomous status for Kosovo and that if Albanians then rejected it, Kosovo should be divided.

Covic, on the other hand, last December published a book, On a Difficult Road, that was forwarded by the well-known nationalist writer, Dobrica Cosic. In it, he proposed a united Kosovo, comprising two entities.

WHAT SERBIA CAN OFFER

Over the last month, the Serbian leadership has clarified that it is open to all options as long as they do not include independence.

In an interview with the daily Vecernje Novosti on May 7, for example, Draskovic suggested the “South Tyrol model” might be applied to Kosovo, referring to the autonomy enjoyed by this German-speaking region in northern Italy. This model, he said, embodied "the principle of virtual sovereignty… with an obligation of positive discrimination towards the Italian minority….Such solution could be applied in Kosmet".

Draskovic said Serbian-Albanian talks would only yield results if "an agreement is achieved from the Serbian side to restrain from using the word 'sovereignty' and from the Albanian side on use of the word 'independence'. Future status must be unconventional and extraordinary because we have here an extraordinary situation".

The foreign minister added, "We seek no sovereignty over the territories in Kosovo inhabited by Albanians…We just want to protect our people and cultural and historical monuments. What is the exact word for this solution? It is open for discussion. What we want is full protection of the Serbian people and protection of the present borders with Macedonia and Albania."

Draskovic denied that the international community was ready to give Kosovo independence, adding that such independence could not be implemented easily.

"The UN Charter does not allow for the establishment of sovereign states through the application of force," he said. "Without the consent of Serbia, a declaration of independence for Kosovo would constitute an act of violence."

Serbia's prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica, has also suggested that unconventional, atypical solutions are possible for Kosovo, such as the solution provided for Bosnia and Hercegovina, where separate entities have been established. Another example he mentioned was Macedonia, where the conflict between Albanians and Macedonians in 2001 ended with the Ohrid Agreement, granting decentralisation and broader rights to the Albanian minority.

At a meeting of his Democratic Party of Serbia held on May 14, Kostunica said Serbia would oppose both conditional and unconditional independence for Kosovo and would strive instead for a solution based on broad autonomy in Serbia, guaranteed by the international community.

Serbian president Boris Tadic, emphasising that the legitimate rights of both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs must be accommodated, also warned against the idea that independence was the simple solution for Kosovo.

"An independent Kosovo with a separate seat at the UN or its own army could cause instability and such a solution is not possible," he said. "But it is also not possible to go back to the old times of [Slobodan] Milosevic. We must find a realistic and peaceful solution between these two extremes."

Some of the solutions put forward in recent years by Serbian intellectuals have also entered the arena of public discussion.

To recall two on them, in 1996, Aleksandar Despic, then president of the influential Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, SANU, suggested drawing a dividing line between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, with extra-territorial provisions for Serbian monasteries along the lines of the autonomy enjoyed by the monasteries of Mouth Athos in Greece.

In 1998, before the armed conflict erupted in Kosovo, Dusan Batakovic, now ambassador in Greece and counsellor to President Boris Tadiç, suggested the establishment of cantons, so both peoples could have their own administrations.

KEY ARGUMENTS AGAINST INDEPENDENCE

One of the main arguments that Serbia's leaders put forward when opposing independence for Kosovo is that Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo is internationally recognised, regulated by UN Resolution 1244,and that there is, therefore, no reason to surrender this territory.

As Misa Djurkovic, an adviser to Kostunica, told IWPR, "It must be clear that no state will give up a part of its own territory just like that. Citizens want their state to observe international law."

He added, "Independence for Kosovo would constitute not only a violation of the UN Charter, but of international order. In addition, Kosovo is not party to the Badinter criteria [drawn up during the conflict in former Yugoslavia to regulate the conditions by which the former republics might obtain international recognition] and it is clear Kosovo was not an independent entity in the former federal Yugoslavia and cannot claim independence on these grounds."

Serbia's next argument against independence is that it would provoke instability both in the region and in Serbia itself.

"Any violent or forced modification of internationally recognised borders might endanger the stability we have achieved," said Djurkovic on May 14, at the Democratic Party of Serbia meeting presided over by Kostunica.

At a press conference on May 12, after a meeting with the Contact Group, Nebojsa Covic, president of the Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija, put the same case even more forcefully.

"An independent Kosovo … will be a constant source of possible conflicts," he said. "We will not accept any forced solution for the status of Kosovo. We do not want to preclude a possibility of Kosovo being returned to Serbia some day, through our efforts or the efforts of some other party."

Other Serbian officials warn of a so-called domino effect, in which Kosovo's independence would endanger the security of other neighbouring states such as Macedonia, which has a large Albanian community. They also mention its potential impact on Bosnia, where the Serb entity, Republika Srpska, could demand the same treatment as the Albanians in Kosovo and request independence.

As Cedomir Antic, adviser to Miroljub Labus, put it, "If Kosovo becomes independent, and that is what I personally wish for, why cannot Republika Srpska be independent also?"

Finally, Serbian officials point to the added danger of radicalising the political situation in Serbia itself.

Misa Djurkovic, Kostunica's counsellor, told IWPR that a decision to grant Kosovo its independence would radicalise the Serbian political scene to a degree that would be difficult to control.

"Double standards, resulting in different interpretations of the same problems, and the lack of a clear strategy and principles on which the solutions are based, all provide grounds for radical forces to say 'the world is still against us'," he said.

"And when Albanian frustration is cited as an argument for independence of Kosovo, I want to reply that there is a lot of frustration among people in Serbia as well."

The hard-line nationalist Serbian Radical Party is, indeed, already scenting an opportunity to capitalise on public fears over Kosovo's future. Aleksandar Vucic, the party's general secretary, on May 5 said the Kosovo situation was "growing more difficult and more unfavourable for the Serbian people and government bodies are doing nothing about it.

"The government must not play around with Kosovo and Metohija. This is state territory. They must insist on this fact and not negotiate behind closed doors on how to facilitate the creation of an independent Kosovo."

According to Djurkovic, western analysts are mistaken in anticipating any significant shift among either the Serbian public or their parties over Kosovo.

"The expectations of Western lobbyists that a shift of consciousness in Serbia will lead to a position that Kosovo should be given up are delusions," he said. "Those who reckon Serbia should enter negotiations and accept a trade-off, such as 'If you give up on this one, you will be rewarded with this or that', are making a mistake. We will not play this game. This government has no mandate from the people to do so."

FEARS OF POLITICAL SUICIDE

Apart from their publicly stated principles for rejecting Kosovo's independence, another factor is that the leadership knows it would mean their own political suicide.

In an interview with the daily Blic, for the April 30 – May 2 edition, President Tadic admitted this, "If the province becomes independent, all the government bodies, including the President of the Republic, will have to reconsider their functions."

This view is confirmed by research published on May 11 by the Belgrade Centre for Marketing Research. Asked whether government officials should be allowed to call for the separation of Kosovo, 90.2 per cent of respondents said "no" and only 1.2 per cent "yes".

Cedomir Antic, Labus's adviser, says Serbia's political parties have little room for manoeuvre on the subject of Kosovo. "On the one hand, the international community wants full independence for Kosovo and is aware that the return of the province to Serbia is not possible," he told IWPR.

"On the other, we have the public, which in 2003 [in a survey] answered with 62 per cent saying Kosovo and Metohija was lost for good, while 70 per cent said this fact should never be acknowledged.”

Antic added, "This is typical of societies in transition - a willingness to accept virtual reality. Unfortunately, for certain reasons major forces and political elites support this virtual reality for their own benefit."

Antic said such an approach in the long run was "highly damaging for Serbia, because Kosovo and Metohija already resembles a state, rather more than Serbia does."

Antic concluded by criticising both Kostunica and Tadic for what he called their weakness and unwillingness to develop realistic, long-term policies on Kosovo.

Dusan Janjic, director of the Forum for Interethnic Relations in Belgrade, agreed that Serbs tend to accept a "virtual reality" when it comes to Kosovo. "All three perceptions [of Serbs and Albanians and international community] are virtual," he said. "Although they know the reality, they do not know what to do with it, except to keep running round in circles."

AVOIDING CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORLD

Although Serbia cannot afford to surrender Kosovo, the leadership is not devoid of political realism when it comes to appreciating the international environment. According to Djurkovic, Serbia knows the Serbs have been almost expelled from Kosovo.

"This is a fact but we still do not want to accept a fait accompli," he said. "We want to recall to attention that Europe and the western world are based on strict observation of norms and international agreements."

Asked what would happen if Kosovo's independence was declared against Belgrade's will, or the admission of Serbia and Montenegro to the European Union was made conditional on acceptance of independence for Kosovo, Djurkovic answered, "If they apply force, which is contrary to their basic principles, they can do so. Serbia is in no position to prevent the independence of Kosovo; it cannot send in troops, nor is willing to do so."

But he added, "Serbia will not accept such an act and will insist on its rights through diplomatic channels. We do not want confrontation with the international community. All we can do is appeal to the international community to observe its own principles."

Some government advisers, such Djurkovic, and several in Tadic's cabinet, believe Brussels will not make Kosovo's independence a condition for admission to the EU anyway. One source from Tadic's office said, "Negotiations [over Kosovo] will not unfold under the pressure of blackmail. The process pertaining to Kosovo is complex and the international community wants a consensus among the parties.Blackmail could only damage the European idea in Serbia."

Djurkovic also believes Europe is not united on Kosovo. "In talks with officials behind closed doors, I get the impression nobody really wants independence for Kosovo," he said.

"Wherever the borders are drawn, huge problems will remain, such as economic backwardness, demographic expansion, criminality...and these problems flow across borders…The European future of this region is forcing us to cooperate. The borders will be a minor issue."

Covic says he also has an impression that members of the Contact Group do not have a united front on Kosovo and "display evident differences".

Antic agrees. "Serbia has just enough of international support to prevent Kosovo and Metohija from ever gaining formal independence," he said. Antic says Russia will not vote for it in the UN Security Council because of its own problems in Chechnya, while China will also oppose it.

As the negotiations loom ahead, Serbia's politicians are aware that there can never be a return to the past. But they still hope they can avoid international recognition of Kosovo's independence.

This is the line that they cannot and will not cross.

Vesna Bjekic is an IWPR contributor and BIRN Serbia associate editor. BIRN is a localised IWPR Balkans project

Everyone is on trial at the Hague

The United Nations war crimes tribunal is not really a court of law. It is a political process directed by the United States and the European Union to punish their political enemies and reward their friends. However, good things sometimes are born from bad policies and the article below shows that this court is having a beneficial effect. The court is working hand and glove with EU promises of membership to get the Balkan states to behave.

Now, if only Macedonia could somehow use this tool to get Greece to behave better towards it ethnic Macedonian minority.

Court on Crimes in Former Yugoslavia Hits Its Stride - New York Times

mong the tribunal's 10 fugitives today are two famous men who have been seen in Serbia, the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his military commander, Ratko Mladic, both indicted on genocide charges. But the government insists it does not know where they are.

The prosecution is particularly pleased about the recent arrival of Momcilo Perisic, the Yugoslav Army chief of staff during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. His trial may rank among the most significant. General Perisic's indictment says that from Belgrade, he secretly ran the surrogate Serbian forces fighting in Croatia and Bosnia, providing the Serb-run troops with personnel, equipment, provisions and payment. His case could directly link Belgrade, and Mr. Milosevic, with military actions and atrocities outside Serbia.

At the tribunal prison, the newcomers include former top officials from Macedonia and Kosovo, two other Balkan regions that need approval and money from the West. Croatia been told its bid to join the European Union will be delayed until it delivers its main fugitive, Gen. Ante Gotovina. "This is the first time political pressure has been applied on such a scale, and we see that it works," said Mirko Klarin, director of Sense, a news agency that has monitored the war crimes court. With so many new suspects, the tribunal can schedule several group trials to speed proceedings. But court officials say privately that even without getting its 10 fugitives, the tribunal cannot meet the Security Council deadline of 2008. Discussions are under way to transfer at least a dozen low-level suspects heldhere to be tried in their home region.

Shaky Balkans need 'new strategy,' panel says

Dear Judy Dempsey,
International Herald Tribune

Next time some lame "commission" discusses the Balkans can you ask this question:

"If any former communsit country adopts the Greek position on minority rights, will they be accepted in the EU and Nato." (Hint ... Greece denies it has any minorties)

Note: Kiro Gligorov seems to be part of this "International Commission of the Balkans

Shaky Balkans need 'new strategy,' panel says

Shaky Balkans need 'new strategy,' panel says
By Judy Dempsey International Herald Tribune

THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 2005
BERLIN A high-powered International Commission on the Balkans has issued a scathing critique of EU and UN policies in the Balkans, accusing both organizations of hindering democratic growth and warning that bleak economic and political conditions may lead to renewed instability.

"The red lights could soon start blinking if we don't take stock of the reality on the ground," said Alex Rondos, former Greek ambassador at large and member of the commission. "The region is not as stable as the EU makes out."

The commission asserts that democracy has been stifled in Bosnia "by the coercive authority" of Paddy Ashdown, the EU's high representative.

The international representatives, the commission says, "dabble in social engineering but are not held accountable when their policies go wrong. If Europe's neocolonial rule becomes further entrenched, it will encourage economic discontent and European electorates would see it as an immense and unnecessary financial and moral burden."

The commission challenged the European Union to formally offer Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia and the province of Kosovo a timetable for admission to the Union, warning that failure to do so could lurch the Balkans into another period of instability and leave the EU mired in the region.

The recommendations by the independent commission, made public in Europe's main capitals over the past few days, propose that in late 2006 the EU should sponsor a summit meeting "that aims to present all Balkan countries with their accession road maps."

Once the countries have met the EU's criteria on respect for human and ethnic rights, implementation of the rule of law and the introduction of a functioning market economy, the commission says these countries could start accession negotiations around 2009-2010 and be ready to join by 2014-2015.

ICG - Independen Kosova good, Independent Srpska Republica bad!

A Macedonian interview with the coordinator in Macedonian of the pseudo - human rights group "International Crisis Group". Painfull to read. The interviewer did not question him on ICG's position on ... you know .... Macedonians in Greece.

ICG’s Whyte: It’s Better for Macedonia if Kosovo Becomes Independent

Whyte: As you know, we've been very supportive of Macedonia on the question of the international use of the correct name of the country, and in opposing any division of Macedonia territorially between ethnic groups. Our judgment is essentially a realist one. We simply do not see a possibility of Kosovo Albanians agreeing to participate in any state structures which are connected to Belgrade. It just won't happen. The legacy of the abuse of Belgrade rule in Kosovo is simply too great. (In addition, it has to be said that Belgrade has made little effort to acknowledge its own past failure to discharge its responsibilities to its own ethnic Albanian citizens.)

Your examples are good ones - the Bosnian Serbs have been participating in the BiH state structures for almost a decade now, and the Turks never withdrew their consent from the Bulgarian state. The situations are very different. We have to ask the question, who will impose a different solution to the Kosovars? You can't say that the Kosovars are morally deficient, as you're implying...